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Abstract 
Citizenship education, defined as learning to live together, requires agreement on certain 
common principles. One central purpose of a state education system is the transmission of 
common normative standards such as the human rights and fundamental freedoms that 
underpin liberal democratic societies. The paper identifies the conceptual roots of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in the sociological concept of utopia and 
Enlightenment cosmopolitanism. In the UDHR, the vision of freedoms that may promote 
human flourishing provides a precise way of conceptualising limits on state power. Whilst 
human rights is not a general theory, the concept has the hugely beneficial property of 
enabling people whose value systems are diverse and apparently incompatible, nonetheless to 
recognise and accept common standards and principles that make living in society possible. 
The implications of this are that human rights education is rightfully recognised as an 
essential component of citizenship education. 
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 Education for citizenship has been introduced in education systems across the world 
as a response to a number of perceived tensions in contemporary societies, particularly those 
resulting from migration and changing demographics as threats from violent extremist 
political movements. These essentially political struggles result from tensions between the 
local and the global; tradition and modernity; competition and equality; the material and the 
spiritual (Delors, 1996). At a global level, the persistence of violent conflicts has been 
characterised as stemming from a clash of civilisations (Huntington, 1996). As sociologists 
raise the ultimate question of whether human beings can in fact live together or whether 
cultures and prevailing modes of thought make peaceful co-existence within and between 
nation states an impossible dream (Touraine, [1997] 2000), educators must grapple with the 
issue of learning to live together. 
 In a globalising world, any educational response to perceived social fractures requires 
a global frame of reference. In this paper I identify theoretical work on utopias and 
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cosmopolitanism as having considerable relevance for education in general and citizenship 
education in particular. I explore the implications for citizenship education of the 
fundamental tenet of  liberal democracy that living together requires agreement on certain 
common principles and procedural values and that these principles therefore need to be 
transmitted through and by the education system.  
 This article is based on a detailed textual analysis of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR) (United Nations General Assembly, 1948) and an examination of its 
historical context. I propose that it can be read as a text that is cosmopolitan in perspective, 
utopian in intention and universal in its potential to enable people whose value systems are 
diverse and apparently incompatible, nonetheless to recognise and accept common standards 
and principles that make living in society possible. The implications of this are that human 
rights education is rightfully an essential component of citizenship education. 
 
Citizenship education as a response to tensions 
 Migration on a global scale brings together populations with very different world 
views and social practices. At a local level manifestations of intolerance and discrimination 
frequently lead to tensions and sometimes violence on a scale sufficient to start to undermine 
confidence in democracy and human rights as the basis for the social contract. Responding to 
concerns by governments to real and perceived threats to social cohesion across Europe, the 
Council of Europe commissioned a group of distinguished academic and political figures to 
report on the challenges arising from the resurgence of intolerance and discrimination in 
Europe. The group identified developments in European society that challenge any 
assumption that there is consensus around the principles of democracy and human rights. As 
well as rising intolerance, manifested in support for xenophobic and populist parties, the 
report highlights concerning levels of discrimination as well as ‘parallel societies; Islamic 
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extremism; loss of democratic freedoms; and a possible clash between “religious freedom” 
and freedom of expression’ (Group of Eminent Persons, 2011:5). The report identifies the 
root of the issue of living together in a liberal democracy as the need to reconcile diversity 
and freedoms. In the report’s recommendations, educators are given an essential role in 
transmitting ‘the norms and values that form the binding element in the functioning of 
society’ (GEP, 2011: 37). This refers to the importance of a common understanding of the 
universal human rights standards embodied in the European Convention on Human Rights.  
 This emphasis on the role of education as contributing to social cohesion follows an 
earlier report by an equally distinguished commission, convened by UNESCO, which 
proposed learning to live together as one of four pillars of education. This is defined in terms 
of a cosmopolitan perspective that envisages all people gradually acknowledging an identity 
as global citizen in addition to local and national feelings of belonging. The Commission 
articulated the conviction that education has the capacity to encourage attempts ‘to attain the 
ideals of peace, freedom and social justice’. In this sense, education is a ‘necessary utopia’ 
(Delors, 1996: 13). I will explore later in this article the potential of the sociological concept 
of utopia to drive struggles for social justice and confront intolerance and violence. 
 Whilst major international reports identify education in general as a response to 
tensions in liberal and democratic societies, citizenship education is a particular site where 
the political nature of these conflicts can be specifically acknowledged, debated and 
addressed (Osler & Starkey, 2005). In England as in many countries, citizenship education 
has been acknowledged as providing an opportunity to discuss challenges for the world such 
as the continuing inequality of extreme poverty, predominantly in the global south, but also in 
neighbourhoods of ostensibly rich cities in the north (DfES, 2005). Young people can at least 
be made aware of ways in which such injustice fuels conflicts and is a source of 
destabilisation for global systems that are interdependent and fragile.  
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 There is also concern in a number of democratic nation-states about levels of political 
engagement, particularly among the young. Citizenship education has been introduced in an 
attempt to help young people to understand democracy and engage with democratic 
processes. However, alongside a concern for the perceived apathy of youth there is a concern 
that youth may pose a threat to society by their participation in violent or anti-social 
behaviour. Citizenship education is in this case intended as a means of socialising young 
people (QCA, 1998; Kerr, 1999).   
 In Europe, where there is a historical consciousness of the legacy of Fascism, there 
are concerns about the growth of anti-democratic and racist movements that may appeal to 
young people and threaten democracy (GEP, 2011; Goodwin, 2011). This issue has also been 
addressed in England in a government-funded research report that gives considerable 
prominence to the importance of United Nations human rights instruments as providing 
standards for living together both within schools and in the wider society (Bonnell, J., 
Copestake, P., Kerr, D., Passy, R., Reed, C., Salter, R., et al.,2011).  European education 
ministers have agreed on the need to challenge such anti-democratic movements and attitudes 
and promote antiracism (Council of Europe, 2002).  Since the attacks on New York and 
Washington on 11 September 2001, democratic governments have seen citizenship education 
as a site for combatting the nihilistic, fatalistic and deterministic propaganda of al-Qaeda. 
This co-option of citizenship education as part of a strategy to prevent terrorism was 
articulated by ministers in the UK from 2001 and the bombings in London in 2005 provoked 
a review of the curriculum to ensure that issues of diversity and identity were made central to 
citizenship education (DfES, 2007; Osler, 2008).  
 A controversial aspect of citizenship education is the extent to which its curriculum 
addresses the issue of diversity and freedoms. There is an intellectual and political tension 
within multicultural democracies concerning the need to promote national unity or cohesion 
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and the need to accommodate, and indeed support, a range of cultural communities within the 
nation-state (Taylor, 1994; Runnymede Trust, 2000). In England, New Labour governments 
(1997-2010)  identified citizenship education as a means to encourage valuing diversity and 
countering racism, initially in a formal response to the recommendations of the Stephen 
Lawrence Inquiry (Home Office, 1999). The 2005 London bombings provided the impetus 
for a further a review of the citizenship curriculum to ensure detailed attention to issues of 
identity and diversity and living together (DfES, 2007). This was reinforced by a duty on 
schools to promote ‘community cohesion’, a concept introduced in a report on responses to 
urban violence (Home Office, 2001). However, in 2010 and early 2011, in what may be 
construed as a concerted response to these tensions from Conservative heads of government 
of France, Germany and the UK, multiculturalism was denounced as a failure (GEP, 2011) 
with the implication that citizenship education should emphasise an essentially homogenous 
national identity. From whatever perspective, citizenship education is nevertheless one 
intervention available to the State for the purpose of addressing destabilising fractures in 
society. 
 A common thread running through these reasons for including citizenship education is 
a requirement for a global perspective, since globalisation is the context that explains the 
unsettling changes to which societies are subject (Osler, 2006). A second common thread is 
the need to transmit normative principles, particularly commitments to democracy as the 
means of providing governance in diverse societies. An International Consensus Panel 
convened by James Banks, director of the Center for Multicultural Education, University of 
Washington Seattle, was set up to attempt to produce guidelines that would be relevant across 
the world. The panel recommended that: 
Increased diversity and increased recognition of diversity require a vigorous re-
examination of the ends and means of citizenship education. Multicultural societies are 
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faced with the problem of creating nation-states that recognize and incorporate the 
diversity of their citizens and embrace an overarching set of shared values, ideals, and 
goals to which all citizens are committed. (Banks et al., 2005: 7).  
The ‘ideals and goals’ for a multicultural society are a utopian perspective. However, utopian 
visions can lead to disastrous consequences and must be treated with extreme caution. This 
article argues that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has the capacity to provide 
both a utopian vision and a set of standards and principles based on equality and diversity. 
The principles can command consensus as to their moral force even when there may be 
disagreements as to the reasons why people are prepared to accept them.  
Utopia and cosmopolitanism  
 Utopian visions characterised some of the most appalling political regimes of the 
twentieth century. Among these, Hitler, Stalin, Mao and Pol Pot governed on the basis that 
they had a vision of a better world. These ‘failed utopias’ (Klug, 2000: 189) nonetheless 
inspired other contrasting visions, based not on superiority of race or class but on the notion 
of human dignity and equality of rights. Alongside what the historian Jay Winter (2006) calls 
the disastrous major utopias were a number of minor utopias, attempts at specific periods of 
time to create new cultures and consciousness based on cosmopolitan perspectives and 
visions of human rights.  
Amongst educationalists there is a current of sociological theory that promotes utopian 
imaginings as having the capacity to raise educational debate from post-modern discourses of 
cynicism and indecision and inspire hope rather than despair. Utopian thinking is 
recommended for educational leadership and management (Halpin, 2003, 2006; Webb, 
2009). It encourages imaginative reconceptualisation of schools as sites of deliberative 
democracy, both in governance and in pedagogy. It lifts the vision of the curriculum above 
the basic prescribed programmes of study. Utopia requires and encourages imagination. The 
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process of imagining utopia challenges taken for granted assumptions and suggests 
alternatives. It is the utopia that ‘introduces a sense of doubt that shatters the obvious’ 
Ricoeur (1978: 19). 
The sociological concept of utopia has been theorised as a driving force motivating 
humans to exercise agency and shape history (Mannheim, [1936] 1991). Politically, utopian 
perspectives may challenge unequal social and economic conditions, for example. Utopia as 
possibility has been theorised by Giddens as ‘utopian realism’ (1990: 156) and by Rawls as 
‘realistic utopia’ (1999: 128). Utopian realism is a space where life politics, based on freedom 
to create a fulfilling life, meets emancipatory politics. Personal fulfilment and human struggle 
for freedom from inequalities may coincide (Giddens, 1990). However, educationalists have a 
responsibility to provide the critical tools to interrupt utopias imagined by populist or 
religious extremists that may require indoctrination or physical coercion to achieve.  
Critical theory, the sociological movement in education inspired by Paulo Freire, also 
engages strongly with ideas of utopia for instance in addressing the question, central to 
citizenship education, of the extent to which the school system really has the capacity to 
become an inclusive public sphere (Torres & Teodoro, 2007). Utopia provides a tool for 
schools and school leaders to make decisions about future choices based on realistic 
evaluations of schools as social systems. Combining utopian vision and sociological insights 
school leaders can come to see ‘not the face of the perfect (and inevitable) future, but the face 
of an alternative, better, and historically possible (but far from certain) future’ (Wallerstein, 
1998: 1-2). Utopia is the vision against which sociological realities can be judged. From this 
process political action may be engaged. 
 Cosmopolitanism is the Enlightenment philosophy associated notably with Immanuel 
Kant. It is based on a liberal conception of human beings as a single community in which all 
have equal entitlement to dignity and to fundamental freedoms. On this account human 
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beings are ‘instantiations of a universal humanity’ (Beiner, 1995:2 original emphasis). The 
cosmopolitan perspective has much to offer educators in multicultural societies in a 
globalised age, since it is an ideal that ‘combines a commitment to humanist principles and 
norms, an assumption of human equality, with a recognition of difference, and indeed a 
celebration of diversity’ (Kaldor, 2003:19).  
 Given the global issues of extreme poverty, denial of rights and injustice, 
cosmopolitanism may appear to be a utopian perspective. In a previous period of mass 
migration, ethnic tension and war the American philosopher and educationalist John Dewey 
sought a conception of education and democracy that could unite students of different 
backgrounds. However, he came up against the dominance of nationalist thinking in 
education systems and noted how these had obliterated previous Enlightenment traditions 
based on cosmopolitanism. The development of nationalised education in the nineteenth 
century resulted in education becoming a civic function that was ‘identified with the 
realization of the ideal of the national state. The "state" was substituted for humanity; 
cosmopolitanism gave way to nationalism’. (Dewey, [1916], 2002:108). 
 Dewey’s analysis helps to explain the role of education in promoting nationalism as a 
dominant ideology throughout much of the twentieth century. In many circumstances 
cosmopolitanism has been presented as unpatriotic and as being in opposition to nationalism. 
In an extreme case, Jews in Nazi Germany were branded as enemies of the state because of 
their assumed commitment to cosmopolitanism. Citizenship education as a function of state 
education is still usually based on a nationalist paradigm. The hypothetical good citizen 
approaches the wider world from an essentially national perspective, knowing about national 
political institutions and traditions (Osler & Starkey, 2009). However, such a conception has 
proved unsatisfactory in contexts of diverse multicultural societies and there is growing 
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recognition that education for cosmopolitan citizenship offers a model more capable of 
engaging the full range of students. 
 At its most basic, the cosmopolitan citizen is one who ‘views herself as a citizen of a 
world community based on common human values’ (Anderson-Gold, 2001:1). This 
challenges purely nationalistic conceptions of citizenship that emphasise the primacy of the 
national community. It suggests that the notion of community can be extended so that its 
limiting case is a community composed of all human beings. Such a community can be 
envisaged within a religious or a humanist perspective.  
 
Human rights as utopian and cosmopolitan vision 
 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a proclamation of a common set of 
standards, norms and principles that has huge moral force on the basis that these standards 
have been adopted voluntarily by all the governments of the world as well as by religious 
communities and civil society. As Donnelly points out, the proclaimed universality of human 
rights ‘is more prescriptive than descriptive. The claim of "universal" human rights is that all 
human beings ought to be treated in these ways, not that they are or have been, or that these 
norms are (let alone have been) accepted everywhere’ (2003: 2). 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) proposes a vision of freedom, 
justice and peace in the world. This is a vision of hope that may inspire the utopian 
imagination. International organisations promote human rights as a common universal 
standard that can guide the projects and actions of teachers and educators. However, in the 
UK, the political right has a record of opposition to the Human Rights Act, favouring instead  
a national Bill of Rights (Conservative Party, 2010) and this has led to misleading stories 
about ways in which human rights have been interpreted circulating in the press and in 
political speeches (Klug, 2011). On the other hand, there has been relatively little exploration 
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of what a commitment to human rights actually includes (Osler & Starkey, 2010). The 
following section, based on a close reading of the text of  the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR),  the foundational text from which all later human rights instruments 
derive, analyses it for its relevance to diversity and freedoms. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights offers a vision and a promise. The vision 
of the new world order is proclaimed in the preamble to the UDHR. It can be read as a 
reaction to the background of wartime atrocities. The second paragraph of the preamble sets 
out a double case: ‘disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts 
which have outraged the conscience of mankind…’ The reason for the Declaration is that 
humanity is shamed because ‘barbarous acts’ have been committed and such behaviour must 
be prevented in future. Those drafting the Declaration did not feel the need to specify the 
nature of the barbarity since it was of recent memory. It was assumed to be in the 
consciousness of those who read and heard it. In the preamble, barbarity is defined in terms 
of ‘disregard and contempt for human rights’. In other words, this highly judgemental phrase 
proclaims that those who act in a way that denies human rights are liable to be considered 
barbarians, that is, uncivilised. Human rights are part of a struggle for civilisation against 
barbarity. The UDHR is an invitation to make moral judgements, particularly about the 
actions of governments and their agents such as the police and the military. 
The basis for such moral judgements is conscience. The ‘barbarous acts’ are said to 
‘have outraged the conscience of mankind’. The drafters thus set themselves up as the 
guardians of the global conscience. It is conscience that enables human beings to distinguish 
between right and wrong, civilisation and barbarity. There is an assumption in the UDHR that 
there is a collective conscience that extends to the whole of humanity. This is highly 
speculative, since it was clearly the case that many well-educated citizens, who would have 
considered themselves to be civilised, participated in or supported war-time and pre-war 
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atrocities. The UDHR is therefore asserting a new normative standard. Just as the main 
religious and humanist traditions aim to develop a conscience of good and evil, right and 
wrong in their followers, so the UDHR proposes the terms on which judgements of 
conscience can be made.  
The concept of human rights offers an alternative standard of judgement to 
utilitarianism and scientific positivism. A utilitarian philosophy based on the greatest good 
for the greatest number has nothing to say about how minorities or the civilian populations of 
enemy states are treated. A misguided scientific view based on racial superiority is also likely 
to encourage assent to policies such as eugenics including forced sterilisation and indeed the 
so-called final solution of genocide. Human rights are proposed as an alternative moral 
philosophical perspective, one that takes into consideration the well-being of every 
individual.  
The preamble of the UDHR looks back and looks forward. It is explicitly a reaction to 
the ‘barbarous acts’ perpetrated in the recent past. It also sets out a vision for the future. In 
fact this future-oriented perspective is given absolute priority as the first element of the 
Declaration: 
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the 
world 
 
The first part of the sentence makes the claim that, collectively, human beings can be 
seen as a single unity. The metaphor is that of a family. A family is conceptualised as people 
of different generations, social statuses (adults and children; females and males, for example) 
and possibly different locations, having a common bond of believing that they are related. 
The metaphor extends this conception to all human beings. The assertion is that it is possible 
to create a belief in and feeling of a common bond that relates any human being to any other. 
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It enables the possibility of choosing an alternative perspective to that which privileges 
national solidarities over all others. 
 
The Indian concept of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam meaning World is Family is a 
cosmopolitan perspective dating back five thousand years (Chaurasia, 2000: iii).  
Cosmopolitanism is also the basis of theistic religions, where humans are seen as descended 
from a single ancestral couple, such as Adam and Eve, or alternatively as sons and daughters 
of a holy father God. The same vision also underpins the humanist, non-religious tradition. 
For example the pre-war Humanist Manifesto, signed by 30 eminent humanists, including 
John Dewey, is based on a ‘deeper appreciation of brotherhood’ (American Humanist 
Association, 1933). Behind the masculine expression is an attempt to define an essential 
humanity as family. The phrase ‘spirit of brotherhood’ is also included in Article 1 of the 
UDHR. 
 
Viewing the population of the world as a human family is a cosmopolitan perspective. It 
engages both the intellect and the emotions. It takes an intellectual leap to conceptualise 
seven billion human beings as a single family. The concept of family implies a feeling of 
belonging, indeed probably a pride in being part of this community in all its diversity and 
with its histories, cultures and achievements. A cosmopolitan perspective includes a global 
perspective that transcends borders. It does not necessarily ignore more local belongings 
including the national dimension. The claim made by the UDHR is that all human beings are 
entitled to be treated with dignity. This is said to be inherent, that is, dignity is the essence of 
what it is to be human. With entitlement to dignity and recognition as a member of the human 
family comes entitlement to rights. An entitlement is a strong claim. Claims to human rights 
are inalienable. They cannot be taken away or denied. The agents of the state, such as the 
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police, may fail to treat someone with dignity (moving prisoners in cattle trucks, to take an 
example from the Nazi period), but we may judge such actions to be barbarous and amoral, 
since although the actions may have been lawful, they are based on removing the status of 
human being, since they remove the dignity of the person. 
A further principle of the UDHR is that human beings have a strong claim to equality in 
rights. This includes the right to be treated with dignity by all other human beings including 
particularly the agents of the state. The basis of this claim is not first and foremost legal. It is 
a moral claim. It assumes that with recognition of humanity and of dignity for oneself comes 
a moral responsibility to extend that recognition to all others. Many of the rights and 
principles of the UDHR were at the time of its drafting and subsequently enshrined in the 
laws and constitutions of member states of the United Nations. The innovation that was 
commitment to human rights lay in the proposal of a single set of fundamental principles and 
norms intended to inform the laws and constitutions of all states. 
As it looks back to the abuses of the past, the preamble to the UDHR simultaneously 
looks to the future. The first paragraph of the preamble to the Declaration is essentially a 
prediction. It makes the claim that universal respect for human rights will constitute ‘the 
foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world’. The UDHR is therefore a challenge 
and an agenda for action. The challenge is to ensure universal respect for human rights for 
this, it is claimed, will bring about justice and peace in the world. Hence the agenda, strongly 
taken up by NGOs, is to identify human rights abuses and discriminations in rights and 
address them.  
The assertion that respect for human rights will lead to world peace is perhaps the 
greatest of the ‘large and unsubstantiated claims’ made in the UDHR (Freeman, 2002: 10). 
Such claims can always be challenged, but it is in the nature of moral, religious, ideological 
and philosophical systems and agendas that in the end they are articles of faith and belief. 
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The Declaration situates its authority in terms similar to those of popular sovereignty. The 
proposed vision is said to represent ‘the highest aspiration of the common people’. However, 
simultaneously, the authority of the UDHR is shown to lie in its acceptance by the 
governments of member states: 
Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the United 
Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms (preamble). 
 
Whilst member states that support the UDHR also accept that human rights should be 
protected by the rule of law, the Declaration is a source of law but it is not in itself law. States 
respectful of human rights voluntarily constrain their agents from using the maximum 
violence of which in theory they have a monopoly.  
 
Human rights and the four freedoms 
Following the reference back to the ‘barbarous acts’ the preamble sets out a vision of 
the future in utopian terms: 
the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief 
and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the 
common people  
 
This section incorporates ideas set out in a speech by US President Franklin J 
Roosevelt as he addressed Congress on 6 January 1941 following his election to a third term 
of office. His four freedoms come as two pairs. Freedom of speech and belief are sometimes 
defined as negative freedoms since it is argued that they simply require inaction by 
government. The freedoms are asserted in opposition to interference from authority. They 
demand ‘the subjection of power to the reason of law’ (Douzinas, 2000: 5). They are amongst 
the civil and political rights essential for any form of democracy and political activity. 
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Although freedom of belief is frequently associated with religious persecution, it applies just 
as much to political beliefs.  
The two other freedoms are freedoms ‘from’. The first is the psychological freedom 
from fear. This is the right of citizens and others living in the state to security, guaranteed 
through a system of policing and laws. Freedom from want is the right of access to basic 
standards of nutrition, health care, income and shelter. Without these, human beings are 
deprived of their capacity to develop their capabilities and thus effectively robbed of their 
dignity and personal liberty (Sen, 1999). 
Freedoms are the essence of human rights. This being the case, it is not surprising that 
most of the articles of the UDHR defend and promote freedoms. Thinking of the rights of the 
UDHR in relation to the freedoms they promote can act as a mnemonic. It is a way of 
remembering the extent of but also the limitation of the rights guaranteed in the 30 articles of 
the UDHR (Osler & Starkey, 2010). 
Freedoms are not absolute. French critics of liberal economic theories have frequently 
used the expression ‘the free fox in the free henhouse’ (see for example De Coster & 
Pichault, 1998: 120). Where there are no constraints but an imbalance of power, the 
advantage is always with the powerful. The power relation is of the essence. A human rights 
perspective balances freedoms with a concern for equality of access to rights. Freedoms are 
exercised in society and claiming them is constrained by the acceptance of the principle that 
all other human beings can claim the same right.  
Struggles for self-expression are an essential element of what it means to be human. 
Freedom of speech is also a political right and it extends to rights to publish and use the 
media. These are truly fundamental freedoms that have been the subject of struggle for 
centuries. People with religious, political and philosophical views that challenge authority 
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have historically used their ingenuity and their capacity to organize to claim their rights of 
expression. 
Although these freedoms appear to require simply an absence of repression or 
censorship, in fact, upholding them can be costly. Modern liberal democratic states are 
required to put in place laws, institutions and mechanisms to protect citizens from the abuse 
of freedom of expression such as hate speech and to ensure that political processes enable 
minorities to be heard, for example. 
The UDHR can be read as a direct reaction to the use of the law by the Nazi state. 
Within a month of coming to power in Germany in early 1933, Hitler revoked the section of 
the Weimar constitution that guaranteed personal liberty. He over-rode previous legal 
protection to allow agents of the state to restrict personal liberty, freedom of expression, 
freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly and association. Privacy laws were also 
ignored so that state agents could intercept postal and telephone communications, search 
houses and confiscate property. Proclaimed in the immediate aftermath of the Reichstag fire, 
Hitler’s decree was seen as aimed at Communists and therefore had a measure of popular 
support. However, once in place it was effortlessly extended to others depicted as enemies of 
the state. The abolition of the right to personal liberty enabled the state to detain political 
enemies under so-called protective custody without requiring the involvement of the police or 
the courts (Kershaw, 1995). 
 Citizens need to be aware that their freedoms are not absolute and that the state may at 
any time attempt to limit the freedoms of citizens, typically in the name of security and 
stability. By defining entitlements to specific freedoms, the UDHR provides the legal and 
political discourse that citizens can use to gain support for campaigns against repressive 
activity and to argue their case where there is a possibility of dialogue with government.  The 
next sections analyse the UDHR through the lens of the four freedoms. They suggest some of 
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the key implications of accepting these rights as normative standards as well as some of the 
tensions and contradictions that may arise when rights are asserted. 
 
Freedom of speech and belief in the UDHR  
Article 12 guarantees respect for privacy. This is essentially freedom from the 
intervention of the state in private communications and correspondence, including monitoring 
of telephones and electronic communications. This article also guarantees the protection of 
the law against slander and defamation.  
Article 18 guarantees freedom of thought, conscience and religion. This article is 
essentially about religious freedom. It includes the right to practice or manifest religious 
beliefs, for example by wearing clothes or symbols of a particular religion. It also includes 
the right to change religion, in other words freedom from coercion to join or remain in a 
particular faith community. 
Freedom of opinion and expression in article 19 includes a right to disseminate and 
receive information through any media regardless of frontiers. This requires that states refrain 
from exercising censorship of the media or blocking access to radio or television broadcasts 
or internet sites. These and all other freedoms are liable to be limited under article 29b by 
permissible laws that are enacted in order to protect the equal rights of others and meet ‘the 
just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society’. 
In order to limit the freedoms of speech and belief, governments often first enact legislation, 
which, in a democracy, entails debate and compromise. From a human rights perspective, 
governments must also defend or be prepared to modify their legal frameworks in cases 
where there is a reasonable claim that restrictions on the freedoms are too severe. The 
principle for judging any legislation is codified in 29b as ‘the general welfare’. Thus 
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governments may be entirely justified in restricting freedoms to trade in images of child 
abuse or to engage in organized crimes including people trafficking.  
Other rights associated with freedom of speech and belief are the freedom of peaceful 
assembly and association in article 20 and the right to a democratic process of government in 
article 21. Peaceful assembly and association are essential for the formation and running of 
political parties and pressure groups. This is a fundamental political freedom. However, 
article 20 is also a guarantee against coercion, so that no one can be forced to join an 
association. Here again, individual freedom is the principle, but it is always within a social 
context.  
The right to education, article 26, opens up all other rights since a right is only a right 
when you are aware of it. Article 27 is the right to participate in cultural life which must itself 
be considered in a human rights perspective. Cultures that deny or fail to respect human 
rights, such as political groups espousing terrorism or religious groups coercing people into 
membership of cults, can and should face restrictions to ensure that they conform to 
normative human rights principles. 
Although there are many ways in which democratic principles can be translated into 
institutions and processes, the right to a democratic process is a right in itself and, as article 
29 makes clear is also the context for all other rights. In other words the vision of freedom 
justice and peace is also a vision of continuous democratization, whether in established or 
emerging democratic states. The World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993 
proclaimed democracy, development and human rights to be ‘interdependent and mutually 
reinforcing’ (UNHCR, 1994: 195). This also implies that democracy is not a steady state but 
a dynamic process of enabling people to live together with a sense of security and justice. 
This is what John Dewey ([1916] 2002: 101) called ‘more than a form of government: it is 
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primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint communicated experience’. It is this 
understanding of democracy that is most relevant to schools and education systems. 
However, as Freeman (2002) points out, human rights and democracy have 
independent and potentially competing theoretical foundations. Democracy is a political 
construct based on the premise that the people should rule. Human rights is a moral and legal 
concept that provides a set of principles against which the performance of governments 
should be judged. They therefore aim to challenge the power of governments since even 
those democratically elected may overturn human rights, as in the case of the first Nazi 
government quoted above. Whilst democratic theory gives power to elected representatives, 
human rights theory limits this power and looks also to judges, courts and popular 
mobilisation as agencies providing checks and balances in the defence of individual 
freedoms. Article 20 specifically asserts the right of access to public service. This is in 
reaction to such rights being denied to groups in Nazi Germany. 
 
Freedom from fear 
Freedom from fear is linked closely to freedom of speech and belief. Numerous 
articles attempt to guarantee freedom from fear of the arbitrary use of power by the state. At 
the most basic this means the right to life (article 3) but this is reinforced by two absolute 
rights namely freedom from slavery (article 4) and from torture (article 5). Freedom from fear 
can be mitigated where there is a judicial system that is seen to be fair and to be based on 
standard procedures. These include recognition as a person before the law (article 6), equal 
protection by law (article 7), no arbitrary arrest, detention or exile (article 9), a fair, public 
trial (article 10), presumed innocence and no retroactive laws (article 11). Where individuals 
suffer extreme state persecution they may claim asylum in another state (article 14).  
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Essentially these are the rights to protection from arbitrary and cruel actions by the 
agents of the state.  Individuals and groups should be able to go about their lawful and 
peaceful business, including participation in political, trades union and cultural activities 
without fearing unjustified arrest, detention or exile (article 9). They may own property and 
this is not subject to confiscation by the state (article 17). When arrested, there should be a 
due legal process which starts by their recognition as a person before the law (article 6), 
where they are guaranteed equal treatment by the law (article 7). Trials should be held in 
public and be conducted fairly (article 10). There must be a presumption of innocence unless 
proven otherwise and no one can be convicted for something that, at the time of the supposed 
offence was not illegal (article 11). 
Freedom from fear is also protected by international law and the international human 
rights regime (article 28). Articles 29 and 30 assert both limitations to rights and the 
indivisibility of human rights by outlawing the use of the freedoms guaranteed to undermine 
human rights or act counter to the spirit of the UN Charter. Article 28 reminds individuals of 
their responsibilities to their communities. It stresses that human rights are guaranteed by 
people acting in solidarity with others and recognising that society depends on reciprocity. 
Although it invokes a sense of duty to the community, such duties are undertaken by a sense 
of moral conviction rather than by state coercion. Indeed there is no specific codification of 
human duties since the reciprocal nature of rights, requiring limiting some rights for the 
protection of the rights of others, is itself a normative principle (Douzinas, 2000). 
Struggles for freedoms strongly inform understandings of human rights as struggles 
for self-realisation, fulfilment and creativity. The UDHR is an inspirational document that has 
been described as an ‘open text, whose reference is past conflict and whose performance will 
help to decide future struggles’ (Douzinas, 2000: 95).  
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Freedom from want 
The articles promoting freedom from want are intended to ensure that human beings 
have sufficient material resources and protection to enable them to access their fundamental 
human rights. Extreme poverty denies access to life to health and often to education and 
participation. The main rights are defined in articles 22-25. Article 22 is the right to social 
security and economic, social and cultural rights. Article 23 is the right to work and fair pay 
whilst article 24 is the equally important right to rest and leisure. The provision of these 
rights should help to ensure the guarantee of article 25 namely the right to an adequate 
healthy standard of living. 
These rights are sometimes referred to as second generation or second wave rights, 
based on the concept of dignity (Klug, 2000). The freedom of speech and belief rights reflect 
the successful outcome in parts of Europe and the USA by the end of the eighteenth century 
of campaigns against political oppression and censorship that had been ongoing from earlier 
centuries. Freedom from rights were conceptualised in relation to struggles for fair conditions 
at work and for social security which became more intense in the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries with the development of political parties and trades unions engaging in 
emancipatory politics (Giddens, 1990). 
In a global perspective access to these ‘freedom from’ rights is often characterised as 
development. In this context there is frequently acceptance that the extent to which 
governments can guarantee them is limited by fiscal resources. This perspective would be 
more convincing if the more powerful economies would address issues such as terms of trade 
whereby they have historically exploited particularly former colonies. It is also more 
persuasive where the extent of government corruption is limited. In fact the Vienna 
Declaration of the World Conference on Human Rights is quite specific in asserting that: 
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While development facilitates the enjoyment of all human rights, the lack of 
development may not be invoked to justify the abridgement of internationally 
recognised human rights (UNHCR, 1994: 197). 
This powerful message to authoritarian and undemocratic regimes did not in itself result in 
changes. It did however, along with other statements from the United Nations provide 
validation for struggles against such regimes that resulted in a number of successful changes 
towards more democratic political systems across the world.  
 
Conclusion 
 Education is about both socialising and liberating. Its functions include transmitting 
societal norms and initiating into official ways of reading the world. Simultaneously 
education promotes critical thinking, imagination and capabilities, particularly the capacity to 
construct multiple identities and subjectivities. Education requires both normative standards 
and utopian vision. Citizenship education is a space where normative expectations can be 
learnt and the possibilities offered by utopian imagining can be explored through democratic 
dialogue. The central place of human rights within citizenship education is promoted by the 
Council of Europe through its Charter of Education for Democratic Citizenship/ Human 
Rights Education (EDC/HRE) (Council of Europe, 2010). 
 Utopian perspectives can easily be obscured by equally powerful visions that include 
the drive for standards and commitments to parental choice of schools. However, 
governments, as well as educators, persist in identifying schools as instruments of policy to 
address major social and political issues. For instanced there is an expectation that schools 
address and help young people to understand global  issues including climate change, 
resource depletion and the world financial system. Issues of globalisation require and 
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understanding of principles on which there is the widest possible global consensus, namely 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
 Whilst leaders may assert the failure of multiculturalism, they nonetheless expect 
schools to function as places for learning to live together. Schools are often at the forefront of 
struggles for recognition by minorities that may find expression in demands to accept 
outward symbols of religious or ethnocultural identity, for example. Responding to such 
issues requires a confident expression of the principles on which teachers and school 
authorities will act. When clashes of values are framed as human rights issues, freedoms are 
contexualised within school systems that are required to also consider equality issues as well 
as the protection of the vulnerable.    
 However, cosmopolitan citizenship education with a utopian vision has the potential 
to challenge existing structures whether of the school or of wider society. It is a programme 
that cannot guarantee control of its outcomes. The essence of human rights is freedom or 
liberation defined within a social and democratic context. The implications of adopting such 
an approach are a possible loss of control. The implications of not adopting such an approach 
may be that young people remain apathetic or that they become tempted by alternative major 
utopias.  
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